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Introduction  
Federalism has long been considered a unique and essentially American 
development in political science.1 The idea of divided authority was not new in 
1787, but American federalism was more than a concept of divided authority, and 
more than merely a confederation of sovereign states. Federalism was the name 
for the hybrid arrangement in which the states comprised the national 
government, while maintaining essential elements of their individual sovereignty. 
In Federalist 9, Alexander Hamilton wrote that the Constitution does not abolish 
the states, but rather incorporates them into the national government through their 
direct representation in the Senate, while leaving them exclusive control over 
important portions of their sovereignty.2 Hamilton was careful to distinguish the 
concept of a federal government from that of a “confederate republic;” he was 
describing a system that transcended a mere “assemblage of societies” and 
represented a new level of government resembling a hybrid between a 
confederation and a centralized national authority.3 Alison LaCroix describes the 
American system as “a new conception of layered governmental 
authority…invented during the colonists’ struggles with metropolitan powers and 
refined during the early republicans’ debates over the institutional mechanisms by 
which that authority would operate.”4  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 LaCroix, The Ideological Origins of American Federalism, 2. 
2 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist 9, in The Federalist Papers, Isaac Kramnick, 
ed. (New York: Penguin Putnam, Inc., 1987), 120. 
3 Ibid. 
4 LaCroix, The Ideological Origins of American Federalism, 220. 
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That the framers could agree to an innovation such as federalism is 
impressive, although perhaps not entirely surprising. The War for Independence 
had set the American populace against the idea of a monarchy, or any other form 
of absolute authority. However, after experiencing the failures of the Articles of 
Confederation, many Americans had little doubt that a stronger general 
government was necessary. The Articles provided no means to raise revenue, 
assemble an army, or enforce its provisions. Faced with crippling debt after the 
Revolution, Americans needed a new strategy for defraying the costs of war and 
cementing the union between the states. Despite the debates over the size and 
scope of that government, and despite disagreements about the degree of 
sovereignty to be retained by the states, many agreed that a hybrid system of some 
kind would have to be adopted wherein the general government maintained 
supremacy in matters affecting the Union, but the states would retain the bulk of 
their sovereign power to govern their own citizens. This hybrid system was 
neither unwelcome, nor was it a cause for concern. In fact, many of the 
Constitution’s framers and their constituents already were familiar with its basic 
structures. Historians have sought the origins of federalism in the advent of 
divided government in England, and in the development of independent, self-
governing communities throughout the North American colonies. However, they 
have largely ignored the manifest parallels between the political construction of 
American federalism and the Congregationalist structures of church governance 
in America and the religious doctrine behind it. 
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 The influence of Congregationalist structures is particularly apparent in 
the relationship established between the general and state governments by the 
drafting of the United States Constitution. Congregationalists embraced religious 
liberty, and preferred autonomous communities, but were cognizant of the fact 
that they were bound together by common religious principles, which provided a 
code of laws for the entire church to follow. The religious principles codified and 
made canonical by early church leaders provided a Constitution of sorts on which 
church members could rely, and divine authority oversaw the management of 
each congregation. If one group transgressed, there were some means provided 
for others to step in extreme cases, but it was presumed that God would take any 
necessary action against groups that strayed from the faith. 
Congregationalists valued their local autonomy, and their congregations 
were, for the most part, free to operate as they wished. John Cotton, a prominent 
seventeenth-century Massachusetts Congregationalist minister who was 
influential in the initial establishment of the Congregationalist church’s structure, 
was clear that no congregation ought to govern another, but instead that each 
should have complete freedom to govern itself. During the seventeenth century, 
the Congregationalist church operated as a loose confederation of autonomous 
local congregations overseen by a presbytery of elders. This loose hierarchy of 
religious authority was familiar to the framers, many of whom were 
Congregationalists, and had experienced Congregationalist influences on the 
politics of their time. There remain questions about whether the framers intended 
their new government to resemble the governing framework of the 
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Congregationalist Church, or whether the similarity was apparent to them. That 
they did rely on established models is nevertheless evident.5 
This paper examines the relationship between Congregationalist church 
structures and American federalism; in the process, it attempts to explain that the 
ways in which the appearance of federalism in North America in the latter half of 
the eighteenth century was influenced by those structures. We can identify early 
models resembling federalism in the history of autonomous local communities in 
the New England colonial territories. These communities, many of which were 
virtual theocracies, based their understanding of political hierarchy on the 
structures of church governance that were a central focus of their lives. As such, 
they expected a general policy of non-interference from central authorities, but 
relied on common values and principles to tie the larger community together.  
To better understand this relationship, we must examine American 
colonial political sermons and political treatises from the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. Congregationalist literature by individuals responsible for 
shaping the growth of the church in the seventeenth century New England 
provides insight into the doctrine that dictated the design and workings of the 
church’s hierarchy. In the 1760s and 1770s, the years approaching the War for 
Independence, political sermons become an added source for our understandings 
of the parallel development of the colonists’ ideas concerning religious and 
secular authority. Throughout American colonial history, sermons were a crucial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Rozann Rothman, “The Impact of Covenant and Contract Theories on 
Conceptions of the U.S. Constitution” Publius, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Autumn, 1980), 
159. 
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part of how politics was conducted within one’s community and how political 
messages were disseminated to the public. Congregationalist ministers, in 
particular, were vocal about their politics, and their opinions influenced the views 
of their churches’ members. As the dispute over secular political authority 
intensified in the period between the enactment of the Stamp Act in 1765 and the 
declaration of American independence in 1776, we find a growth of attention to 
secular political argument about governance and its parallels with religious 
argument about church governance in the profusion of sermons available for 
study.  We also can detect Congregationalist influences can also be seen in such 
documents as The Federalist and other pro-ratification pamphlets and writings, as 
well as in the works of Brutus and other opponents of the Constitution (sometimes 
labeled or stigmatized as “Anti-Federalists.” These writings have been covered 
extensively by existing scholarship, but scholars have paid scant attention to the 
resonances of Congregationalist ideas about church governance that can be found 
within them.  
 
Scholarship 
 The rich and diverse array of scholarship on the topics of 
Congregationalism and American federalism tends to concentrate on English 
concepts of divided authority and Enlightenment political philosophy, rather than 
the relationship between religion and American governmental framework. 
Federalism is frequently appears as a focal point in constitutional or revolutionary 
histories, whereas historians typically examine Congregationalism in the context 
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of its cultural and spiritual influence on colonial and revolutionary New England, 
or its doctrinal influence on the framing of the Constitution. Nevertheless, several 
authors have written on the role of the separatist Christian denominations—
Presbyterianism and Congregationalism in particular—on the development of 
secular government institutions in New England. Several others offer useful 
insights into the origins of American federalism and how such an arrangement 
came to shape the heart of the new American republic.  
Alison LaCroix focuses on the intellectual origins of federalism, 
attempting to extract the ideology of federalism from the broader ideology of 
republicanism. She argues that the process of constitutionalizing federalism in the 
debates of the 1780s was intended primarily to evade the problem of imperium in 
imperio, the state within the state.6 As the colonists grew more distrustful of 
British authority, they moved further away from an indivisible model of 
governmental authority.7 
The colonists’ experience with divided government, however, goes back 
much further than the second half of the eighteenth century. The ideas that led to 
the American arrangement between the states and the national government are 
rooted in experiments of divided authority in England, as well as in the communal 
approach to colonial government structures that were much more democratic than 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Alison LaCroix, “Rhetoric and Reality in American Legal History: A Reply to 
Gordon Wood” University of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper Number 356, 
(2011), 733. 
7 Alison LaCroix, The Ideological Origins of American Federalism (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 96. 
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is usually acknowledged.8 LaCroix, like many others, accepts the ideological 
influence of Puritan churches on American political development while 
dismissing the organizational contributions. 
 Bruce Kuklick and Michael Winship address certain spiritual values that 
made their way into not only the daily lives, but also the political development of 
colonial government in New England. These values also affected the political 
development of colonial government in New England. Small, close communities 
with a sense of superior theological purity and a belief in social uniformity led to 
communal theocracies in which strong, centralized authority was suspect.9 
Kuklick concentrates on the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but he finds in 
early American Puritanism resonances with the founders’ interests to resonate in 
the interconnectedness of self-interest, happiness, and virtue in early American 
Puritanism.10  
Michael Winship takes Kuklick’s argument a step further with his concept 
of “Godly Republicanism,” defined as “a constitutional arrangement designed to 
preserve the purity of the churches and the liberty of the people.”11 Where 
Kuklick was concerned with the insular nature of Puritan daily life, Winship 
addresses how Puritans, and Congregationalists in particular, found ways to 
compromise with the demands of a large and diverse colonial society while 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 David D. Hall, A Reforming People: Puritanism and the Transformation of 
Public Life in New England (New York: Random House, Inc., 2011), 51. 
9 Bruce Kuklick, Churchmen and Philosophers (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1985), 9. 
10 Ibid., 60. 
11 Michael Winship, “Godly Republicanism and the Origins of the Massachusetts 
Polity” The William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, Vol. 63, No. 3 (July 
2006), 427. 
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preserving their own spiritual purity according to the demands of conscience. His 
treatment of New Divinity scholars in the latter third of the eighteenth century 
devotes particular attention to their distinction between covenant and constitution. 
The New Divinity scholars gained popularity in the late eighteenth century and 
relied on a modified Calvinism that embraced the free will of man to submit to 
divine design.12 Rather than a moral covenant, a constitution represented God’s 
legal relationship with man.13 
 Barry Shain explores the meanings that colonial Puritans attached to 
important political concepts. In doing so, he acknowledges the more democratic 
approach to government institutions and their relationship to doctrines of faith 
that were at the center of life in colonial New England. Like Kuklick, he notes the 
mistrust of an elite, centralized government inherent in the roots of reformed 
Protestantism.14 Shain uses many political sermons to make his case, a valuable 
method for discovering the colonial understanding of the nature of the 
relationship between God and government, as we will see later.   
 
Early Congregationalism 
The beginnings of federalist thought are evident in the emergence of 
Congregationalism, the seeds of which we can trace to early separatist movements 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Samuel Hopkins, The System of Doctrines Contained in Divine Revelation, 
Explained and Defended (1793) Google Books: Accessed May 4, 2014 
https://play.google.com/books/reader?id=7m4PAAAAIAAJ&printsec=frontcover
&output=reader&authuser=0&hl=en&pg=GBS.PR1., 395 
13 Ibid., 61. 
14 Barry Shain, The Myth of American Individualism (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press; 1996), 52. 
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in England. These early Puritans advocated separation from the Anglican Church 
due to a desire to return to a purer manifestation of divine faith.15 St Augustine 
postulated that there were two churches: the invisible, and the visible. The 
invisible church was pure, and included all people living or dead, who were slated 
for salvation. The visible church was less pure and included only those living 
individuals who professed belief in its doctrine.16 The separatists desired a visible 
church that was as close as possible to the invisible one, and so they attempted to 
distance themselves from the Anglican Church, which they believed was tainted 
by the membership of ungodly individuals.17 One of the motivations for 
emigration to the American colonies was the desire for control over church 
membership. Under the parish system in England, this was impossible to 
achieve.18 
Elements of Congregationalist ideology can be traced back to the earliest 
Puritan separatist movements. Robert Browne advocated a form of 
Congregationalist organization for the Church of England as early as 1579. 
Browne’s attempts at establishing a separate Congregationalist Church led to his 
arrest, but the idea attracted interest from his contemporaries nonetheless. Indeed, 
more than half of the passengers on the Mayflower in 1620 were Brownists. John 
Cotton was similarly persecuted in England for his separatist teachings, yet his 
sermons gained wide popularity, leading him to flee to the Massachusetts Bay 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Edmund Morgan, Visible Saints: The History of a Puritan Idea (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1965), 33. 
16 Ibid., 3. 
17 Ibid., 33. 
18 Ibid. 
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Colony in 1633.19 Cotton soon established himself there as an influential 
Congregationalist leader, and in 1644 he wrote his “Keys to the Kingdom of 
Heaven and the Power Thereof.” In this treatise, he maintained that the divine 
“key of church power” must be given to “the brethren of the church.” He then 
clarified the allocation of this power (which he defined as jurisdiction, or the 
authority to impose order): “The Gospel alloweth no Church authority… to the 
brethren, but reserveth that wholly to the Elders; and yet preventeth the tyranny 
and oligarchy, and exorbitancy of the Elders, by the large and firm establishment 
of the liberties of the brethren, which ariseth to a power in them.”20 James 
Madison echoed this sentiment when he wrote in 1788, “In framing a government 
which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you 
must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place 
oblige it to control itself.”21  
In colonial New England, church and government were intertwined, and 
the Puritan population understood that there was symmetry, if not symbiosis, 
between the two. As such, the structures that defined the scope of 
Congregationalist church government took many of the same forms as the 
colonial governments, and later, the national government. In his True Constitution 
of a Particular Visible Church, printed in London in 1642, John Cotton asked and 
answered the question, “What form of government is the government of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Cotton’s sermons were also popular in Massachusetts, where he continued to 
dazzle his congregation with a combination of metaphorical and legal language. 
20 John Cotton. “Keys of the Kingdom of Heaven and the Power Thereof,” 1644. 
Accessed May 4, 2014, https://archive.org/details/TheKeysOfTheKingdom. 
21 James Madison, Federalist 51, in The Federalist Papers, ed. Isaac Kramnick  
(New York: Penguin Putnam, Inc., 1987), 320. 
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church?”22 His answer to this and subsequent questions detailed a church polity 
dependent on the wisdom of a body of elders chosen by the congregation and 
charged with moral and administrative authority. Cotton was clear in his 
Constitution that the body of the church was divinely endowed with exclusive 
powers of self-government. Their authority was to be exercised transparently, “in 
the open face of the brethren of the church,” as Cotton phrased it. Nevertheless, 
Cotton’s Constitution included built-in checks on the independence of individual 
congregations.  
Cotton noted in his Constitution that no congregation could exercise 
power over another, but that each congregation possessed equal power with the 
others. He likened the relationship between congregations to that between 
sovereigns, “all of them queens… none of them concubines.”23 Likewise, 
Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist 6 that in commercial republics such as 
the United States, disparate local interests like those manifest in the individual 
states would be guided in their domestic diplomacy by an attitude of mutual 
interest, cultivating what he described as “a spirit of mutual amity and concord.”24 
Cotton’s Constitution included provisions for encroachment on congregational 
jurisdiction in his answer to the self-posed question, “What course is there left to 
reform such corruptions as may arise in any church?” He provided different 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 John Cotton. “The True Constitution of a Particular Visible Church,” 1642. 





24 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist 6, in Kramnick, 106. 
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answers addressing two variations of the potential problem. If said corruption 
were confined to a portion of the church body or congregation, then it was the 
responsibility of the church brethren to address the matter internally, within the 
congregation. If somehow an entire church body were to become corrupt, 
however, Cotton reminded his flock that although no single congregation was 
subordinate to another, the equal power that they shared enabled outside church 
members to investigate the matter and take appropriate action. Such recourse 
ranged from admonishment in the mildest case to dissolution in the most severe, 
although the latter required the collective effort of the entire Congregationalist 
Church acting unanimously.25 
Throughout the rest of the seventeenth century and into the eighteenth 
century, church and government were inextricably linked in Massachusetts, and 
Congregationalist doctrine informed the ways that colonial government evolved. 
In spite of attempts by moneyed elites to gain control of local governments 
thereby to establish a more centralized authority, the common people reacted with 
a widespread movement reaffirming local communalism, or a shared sense of 
collective liberty, which led to the further development of independent towns and 
churches.26 The people may have felt entitled to this level of direct control. The 
Massachusetts Charter of 1691, which formally established the Province of 
Massachusetts Bay, promoted the colonists’ freedom to follow the religion of 
their choice (although not Catholicism). As a result, Congregationalist provincial 
officials voluntarily limited their control over the lives of the citizens to promote 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Cotton, “The True Constitution.”  
26 Shain, 78. 
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more orthodox Congregationalism in opposition to the centralizing efforts of 
officials in London.27 Throughout the rest of the seventeenth century, 
Congregationalism dominated religious practice in Massachusetts and was at the 
heart of colonial New England culture.28 
 
Colonial Federalist Development  
Key to many separatists’ understanding of man’s covenant with God was 
the voluntary association of individuals with the church.29 In the 
Congregationalist church, this manifested as an emphasis on the explicit 
expression of faith and commitment to one’s congregation, although all the 
Puritan denominations shared a concept of an implicit covenant of faith.30 Such 
covenants obligated congregations to adhere to the principles and ethical practices 
of their faith.31 Each covenant was unique to a particular congregation, and 
emphasized Old Testament notions of a chosen people, set apart from all others 
by their commitment to doctrinal values and divinely protected against the evils of 
the world at large.32 The necessity of a voluntary commitment to that covenant 
was understood by all who advocated movement away from the more 
authoritarian Anglican model. The latter more closely resembled Catholicism, in 
which man’s relationship with God was legitimized by liturgy and ritual rather 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Ibid, 77. 
28 Patricia U. Bonomi, Under the Cope of Heaven: Religion, Society, and Politics 
in Colonial America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 73. 
29 Morgan, 31. 
30 Ibid, 28. 
31 Hall, 132. 
32 Ibid., 133. 
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than personal commitment and faith. In the biblical context, the word “covenant” 
can mean different things, but from the mid-seventeenth century forward, leading 
Puritan theologians defined it more narrowly, as “a bargain, a contract, a mutual 
agreement, a document binding upon both signatories, drawn up in the presence 
of witnesses and sealed by a notary public.”33 A crucial element of the idea of the 
religious covenant was that it was binding on both parties. Unlike an oath sworn 
to a superior, the covenant between man and God was an expression of both 
sides’ promises and obligations to one another.34 
In this way, the mechanics of the Congregationalists’ covenant with God 
was not very different from a legally binding contract between men, or that 
between a government and its citizens. Similarly, the framers of the Constitution 
were influenced by John Locke’s social contract theory, which ascribes the 
legitimacy of authority to the consent of the individuals that submit to it. Because 
of this, they used the legal terminology of contracts to express the obligation of 
the government toward the citizens of the United States. The concept of 
governmental obligation was of utmost importance to the framers, as Americans’ 
support both for resistance to English rule and for the new American government 
depended on the concept of constitutional limitations on power.35 Indeed, as the 
War for Independence and the subsequent years under the Articles of 
Confederation drained the Americans’ optimism and enthusiasm for patriotic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Perry Miller, Errand Into the Wilderness (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1996), 60. 
34 Ibid., 61. 
35 Rothman, 152. 
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duty, the need for a more stable and effective government, but one with firmly 
delineated limitations and obligations, became clearer.36 
 In haste to create a national government in the wake of the Revolutionary 
War, but fearful that a powerful central government might give way to a 
monarchy, a committee formed to draft the Articles of Confederation. They were 
ratified and implemented in March of 1781.37 Many of the basic structures were 
already present that would eventually reappear in the Articles and Amendments of 
the Constitution, but a great deal of the parameters of the national government 
were left undefined. Although the Articles stated that the cost of war would be 
defrayed by all the states, no mechanism was provided for the collection of funds 
to be routed toward that debt. The national government under the Articles 
possessed no means to raise revenue, nor to assemble an army, and there was no 
federal judiciary. There was no executive, and the Congress held authority in 
disputes between the states.38 
Unlike the Constitution, which in most cases outlines powers that the 
federal government possesses or does not possess, the Articles concentrate largely 
on the scope of states’ powers.  The second Article of Confederation read, “Each 
state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, 
jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to 
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the United States, in Congress assembled.”39 This concept, and very similar 
language, would reappear in the Constitution’s Tenth Amendment, but would be 
absent from the document drafted at the convention in 1787.40 The Full Faith and 
Credit Clause appears in the Articles in nearly identical language to that found in 
Article IV of the Constitution.41 The primary difference is that the Constitution 
provides power to Congress in determining the manner by which it should be 
administered.42 The Articles stipulate in particular that no state should engage in 
diplomacy nor declare hostilities toward a foreign nation without the consent of 
all the sovereign states.43 The Articles of Confederation leaned so far in favor of 
protecting state sovereignty that the national government they established was 
largely impotent. It was clear that a new approach to dividing state and national 
authority was required. 
 Benjamin Franklin said of the need for a new United States Constitution, 
“We have been guarding against an evil that old states are most liable to, excess 
of power in the rulers, but our present danger seems to be defect of obedience in 
the subjects.”44 The failures of the Articles of Confederation, along with 
increasing concern over foreign affairs, led to the need for the Federal Convention 
in 1787. In a speech delivered that June before the general assembly of 
Connecticut, Governor Samuel Huntington explained that “the confederation was 
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framed whilst the country was still smarting under the hand of arbitrary power; it 
seems to have been the leading object of farmers to erect an authority over this 
country without committing absolutely any power to it.”45 Huntington, a former 
President of the Continental Congress, was well-versed in Congregationalist 
thought, having educated himself in the library of Congregationalist minister 
Ebenezer Devotion, and having married Reverend Devotion’s daughter, Martha.46 
The system established by the Articles of Confederation was much closer 
to John Cotton’s vision of autonomous local entities overseen by a central 
authority that intervenes only when absolutely necessary, or in matters concerning 
the entire community as a whole, than to a Hamiltonian conception of a unified 
national government for an American nation. In apportioning authority between 
the state and federal governments, the framers of the Constitution drew from 
existing models of administrative organization appearing in colonial American 
governments. The result was a hybrid document containing old and new elements, 
and justified as such by key framers and supporters of the Constitution during the 
ratification controversy of 1787-1788, but at that document’s core was a new 
founding covenant for the American people.  Ratification of the new Constitution 
sealed the bargain, and the new founding covenant, between the federal 
government and the American public.47 
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Popular sovereignty, the concept that governments maintain legitimate 
authority only through the consent of the governed, was at the heart of the 
republican government envisioned by the American founders in the late 
eighteenth century. Similar ideas also appear in John Cotton’s early writings on 
the source and distribution of authority within the Congregationalist Church. 
Cotton’s description of the duties of the Church to its congregants bears striking 
similarity to notions advanced a century later by the authors of The Federalist 
with regard to government’s obligation to individual citizens and the nation as a 
whole. 
 The fear of competing authorities and a centralized government that could 
restrict the autonomy of the states was the source of much of the debate over the 
ratification of the Constitution. 48 The desire of the American people to unite as 
one while maintaining their identity within each individual state presented a 
unique dilemma, but one that the framers were well-equipped to confront. 
Whether they intentionally utilized the familiar structures of Congregationalist 
governance, and whether they were even aware that they were mirroring those 
structures, is less important than the fact that they did so.49 
 John Winthrop, an influential Puritan lawyer who arrived in Salem in 1630 
and the first governor of the Massachusetts Bay colony, famously described the 
colonial experiment in North America as building “a city on a hill.” His sermon 
aboard the Arbella en route to the colony argued that only through the people’s 
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covenant with God could a stable new society thrive.50 In 1644, as governor of the 
Massachusetts Bay Colony, he drew a firm distinction between the “liberty of the 
people” and the “power of authority” that belonged to the governor and the 
magistrates, thus separating the magistracy from inclusion in popular sovereignty. 
These were the same categories that John Cotton had already used to distinguish 
the independence of the clergy from the liberty of the congregation.51 Winthrop’s 
devout Puritan understanding of church hierarchies informed his convictions 
about the appropriate distribution of secular authority in the colonial government.  
 
Local Autonomy Within a Union 
 Throughout the 17th and 18th centuries Congregationalist ministers and 
other influential church leaders disseminated political analysis and argument 
through their sermons. Many Congregationalists preached such values as liberty, 
equality, and the public good. Many urged their congregations to support a strong 
centralized government; others emphasized the importance of local autonomy and 
public participation in a democratic process.52 Nonetheless, all seemed to have an 
understanding of the dichotomous nature of a unified republic consisting of 
sovereign colonies, or later of sovereign states. Perhaps this understanding was so 
familiar and influential because it so resembled their own understanding of each 
congregation’s role within the church, and of the church’s relationship with God.  
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 Elisha Williams, the great-grandson of John Cotton, was a former 
Congregationalist pastor and a Connecticut State Supreme Court Justice when he 
wrote The Essential Rights and Liberties of Protestants. It was intended as a 
polemic against a 1742 Connecticut statute prohibiting ministers from preaching 
outside their own parishes, and decreeing that those who did so would be deprived 
of support and authorization to preach. In his pamphlet, he distinguished between 
the powers of church government and the powers of civil legislature: “Every 
society ought to be subject only to its own proper legislature. The truth of this is 
evident at the first view; and civil societies readily adhere to this as an inviolable 
principle.” In his discussion of church autonomy, Williams made clear that the 
government had no authority over those powers that belonged solely to the 
church: “Every worshipping assembly best knowing their own particular 
circumstances, and being best able to judge what may be convenient or 
inconvenient in the case…this is a right our worshipping assemblies claim.”53 
Many Congregationalists similarly praised limitations on the federal 
government, not only to prevent its interference in religious affairs, but also in 
order to protect the sovereignty of the states. Samuel Cooper, a dedicated patriot 
and prolific writer of political literature, declared in his “Sermon on the 
Commencement of the Constitution” (that of Massachusetts) in 1780, “I need not 
enlarge before such an audience upon the particular excellencies of this 
constitution: How effectually it makes the people the keepers of their own 
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liberties, with whom they are certainly safest.” Cooper is almost certainly 
referring to the sovereignty of the states and the participation of the citizens in 
their own government. “How nicely it poizes the powers of government, in order 
to render them as far as human foresight can, what God ever designed they should 
be, powers only to do good.”54 
There were potential conflicts between the ideas of individual church 
autonomy and a centralized national government. Mark Garrett Longaker, scholar 
of political rhetoric, has suggested that the Congregationalist church was known 
in the late eighteenth century for theological disagreements among its adherents, 
as well as for the typically Federalist viewpoints of its clerical leadership.55 
Longaker draws particular attention to the possible conflict in the views of 
Timothy Dwight, Congregationalist minister and prominent leader of the New 
Divinity movement, as an example of the dichotomy present in many 
Congregationalists’ political and religious positions. Dwight advocated the 
unification of the colonies well in advance of the Revolution, and bemoaned th 
lack of organization that central oversight would remedy. At the same time, 
Dwight defended the Congregationalist churches’ right to autonomous 
governance, free from the influence of a hierarchical church structure.56  
The “New Divinity” theological system, based on the writings of Jonathan 
Edwards and developed by Congregationalist minister Samuel Hopkins, was a 
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new school of religious thought emphasizing human free will, along with the 
exercise of divine will upon human beings. Among the papers Hopkins left when 
he died was a document titled, “Articles of a Church,” which, much like John 
Cotton’s True Constitution, established a set of guidelines for church governance. 
These guidelines provided procedures for admission to the church, education of 
children, and selection of deacons and pastors, among other policies. Of particular 
note was Article VII, which codified the nature of a congregation’s autonomy. 
“There ought not to be any appeal from the judgment and decision of a particular 
church, to any higher judicatory which has authority to set aside what they do, or 
oblige them to recede from it.” He qualified this ban by adding, “But it may be 
proper and expedient, in cases that are difficult…to request the assistance of 
pastors and delegates of other churches, in order to obtain light and direction.”57 
Hopkins’ vision did not allow for outside entities to have any real authority over 
internal church matters, but accepted the benefit, and the potential necessity, of 
belonging to a greater organization dedicated to a common goal. The Hopkinsian 
New Divinity spread throughout New England, influencing other 
Congregationalists to develop similar theological systems.  
 New Divinity teaching grew more widespread and more ingrained in New 
England into the latter half of the eighteenth century. Nathanael Emmons, who 
was considered a leader among the emerging new school of theologians that was 
emerging at that time, preached a modified version of Hopkinsianism, taking for 
granted the Calvinist concept of divine sovereignty, while advancing the idea of 
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human free agency. 58 Emmons described his teachings as lying between two 
extremes: the free exercise of will and the submission of that will to the divine 
authority. The middle-ground position of his teachings between these stark 
extremes, in his view, justified them as true.  We can infer from this 
understanding that Emmons was comfortable with the juxtaposition of apparently 
opposing concepts, such as the political autonomy of individual states unified 
under a general government.  
Emmons wrote that liberty was the “birth-right of man” and that “in free 
republics, where liberty is equally enjoyed, every man has weight and influence in 
proportion to his abilities, and a fair opportunity of rising, by dint of merit, to the 
first offices and honours of the state.”59 His sermon, “The Dignity of Man,” 
delivered in Providence in 1787, extolled the virtues of preparing oneself to be a 
wiser and more productive participant in society. In 1799, in the midst of the 
national political crisis occasioned by the quasi-war with France, Emmons 
delivered a sermon maintaining that the framers had built the national government 
on the principle of providing the best possible society for the people. He 
explained in his discourse that it was the duty of the various components of 
government to provide checks upon one another, and that disagreement 
strengthened, rather than weakened, the state. This was in accordance with the 
principles to which the framers of the Constitution adhered in 1787. Emmons also 
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obliquely referenced the concept of federalism, in his rebuttal to those who feared 
that the Constitution’s promotion of a strong national government would lead to a 
monarchy: “Is there an intelligent man in America, who seriously believes, that it 
is easier to turn our government into a monarchy than into a democracy?”60  
Many Congregationalists saw unlimited power as the greatest threat a 
government could pose to its people, an insight that was informed by years of 
political interference with their own religious hierarchies. In 1775, 
Congregationalist minister Samuel Langdon delivered a speech on the dangers of 
a corrupted government, which he defined as one that had delegated too much 
authority to itself and drawn too much away from the divine government of God. 
He used as a model the ancient Jewish tribal governments.61 Using the divine 
code of laws given to them by God as their constitution, he argued, the Jews 
governed by deferring to tribal leadership and city elders in all civil and criminal 
matters. These chiefs and elders would call local assemblies of the people, who 
would, by popular agreement and guided by their tribal leadership, manage the 
outcome of disputes and determine civic policy.62 Langdon argued that the Jews 
did not need a central government run by men, as they were guided by the divine 
word of God, which represented in this case a national government. The Jews did 
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comprise a nation by many definitions of the word, by right of their shared 
heritage, language, religion, and cultural experiences. In this regard, the code of 
laws in the Jewish bible could be considered their constitution. Ultimately, 
Langdon argued for local autonomy as practiced by the tribes of Israel, joined by 
the shared guidance of biblical law. He did not argue that a central authority was 
unnecessary, only that one already existed. With biblical law as the unifying focus 
of church government, the benefits of centralizing a secular government could be 
inferred.  
 
The Federalist and the “Anti-Federalists” 
Federalists and “Anti-Federalists”63 alike were committed to the power of 
the individual states to govern themselves in local matters, and Congregationalist 
resonances appeared on all sides of the Constitutional debate. One central 
question in the ratification debates concerned the degree to which the states 
should defer to the federal government. Deference to a Congregationalist model 
could lend support to either side, depending on whether one viewed the 
Congregationalists as a loose collective of self-governing congregations, or as a 
community unified by their common religious principles. This question was 
neatly articulated by an anonymous Anti-Federalist author calling himself 
“Federal Farmer” in his October 8, 1787 letter in the Country Journal of 
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Poughkeepsie. “How far can the states be consolidated into one entire government 
on free principles?”64  
 Supporters of the Constitution sought to answer this challenge and to 
defend the proposed new charter of government as embodying a sensible balance 
of the competing claims of the general government and the states.  In so doing, 
they echoed the spirit of Congregationalist answers to these questions.  For 
example, The Federalist, a series of letters published in New York intended to 
sway people to support the Constitution, resonated with the spirit of 
Congregationalist hierarchy as its authors made strong arguments for federalism 
as a safeguard of the states’ powers under the Constitution. In Federalist 39, 
James Madison responded to claims that the Constitution unfairly and 
dangerously would consolidate the states into one national government. One 
example cutting against this alarmist claim, he insisted, was the process by which 
the Constitution itself would be ratified, writing, “It is to be the assent and 
ratification of the several States, derived from the supreme authority in each State, 
the authority of the people themselves. The act, therefore, establishing the 
Constitution, will not be a national, but a federal act.”65 Madison explained that 
the ratification of the Constitution would result not from the agreement of a 
majority of the people within the ratifying states, but by their unanimous consent 
only. He argued that were the Constitution creating a single, unified national 
government, then “the will of the whole people of the United States would bind 
the minority.” Much as Cotton described the relationship between individual 
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congregations, Madison asserted that the states would retain a great deal of 
autonomy under the Constitution even if it should be adopted. He then highlighted 
the dual nature of the new American government, saying it was “of a mixed 
character, presenting at least as many federal as national features.” 66 
 In the rest of that essay, Madison defined the United States government 
and by piling up examples to demonstrate the framers’ balancing of national and 
federal principles, modes of organization, and interests. In operation, he argued, it 
is national. The way in which the government operates on the people, and on the 
states which comprise the nation, demonstrates the supremacy of the national 
government over the states, through elected representatives. However, he also 
maintained that, with regard to the extent of the national government’s powers, it 
is federal, as those powers are limited in jurisdiction and that local and municipal 
authorities are part of the whole; they participate in the overall supremacy of the 
national structure. Madison explained that this arrangement would result in a 
government of dual natures, but erring on the federal side, that is, “the proposed 
government cannot be deemed a national one, since its jurisdiction extends to 
certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several states a residuary and 
inviolable sovereignty over all the other objects.”67 
 The arguments made by opponents of the Constitution, like those made by 
its supporters, relied on familiar structures and concepts of self-government. The 
authority of the people is central to the opponents’ rebuttals of the Federalists’ 
calls for a more energetic central government. In their opposition to the 
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ratification of the Constitution, they repeatedly invoked the sovereignty of the 
states and the powers reserved to them, as well as the danger that a Congress with 
too much authority might run roughshod over the states and threaten the liberty of 
the people. For example, in a 1788 speech before the Virginia Ratifying 
Convention, Patrick Henry argued that it would be too easy for Congress to 
amend the Constitution without the consent of the majority of the people—that if 
a bare majority in the smallest states banded together they could enforce 
legislation upon the majority of the nation’s population.68 Echoing arguments and 
analyses made by the Congregationalists over a century before concerning church 
governance, Henry felt that the entire population should have a say in determining 
making the laws of the states and of the nation.  
 One of the most common concerns of the Constitution’s opponents was 
that the system of checks and balances in the Constitution would be unable to 
protect the liberty of the people if the men elected to represent them were corrupt. 
Samuel Bryan, responding to arguments made in The Federalist and publishing 
under the pseudonym “Centinel,” wrote that the creation of opposition between 
the legislative and executive branches, to be balanced by the judiciary, would be 
effective only if one believed “human wisdom competent to the task of instituting 
three co-equal orders in government, and a corresponding weight in the 
community to enable them to exercise their several parts.”69 “Letters from a 
Federal Farmer,” published in the Poughkeepsie Country Journal in 1787 and 
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1788, described the federalism of the new constitution as a system of 
representation “unnaturally divided between the general and state governments.”70 
For the lack of constraint in the national government, the Federal Farmer blamed 
the absence of certain individuals from the Federal Convention in Philadelphia. 
He argued that the men chosen as delegates, “principally connected with 
commerce and the judicial department,” designed a government with a “strong 
tendency to aristocracy now discernable in every part of the plan.”71  
 Many Federalist thinkers took to the newspapers to share their opinions 
and promote the creation of a stronger national government. For example, an 
editorial in the American Herald of Philadelphia questioned “whether, on the one 
hand, the vast continent is to be distributed into vast republics; or, on the other, 
the majesty of a world, centered on an individual,” but declared that “it seems to 
be unanimously agreed, that a strong and efficient executive power must be 
somewhere established.”72  
 Dr. Richard Price of London, a distinguished nonconformist preacher and 
philosopher, was a firm supporter of the Revolution and an active political 
pamphleteer. He engaged in regular correspondence with such men as Thomas 
Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, and John Adams. In 1787 he wrote, in anticipation 
of the Federal Convention, “It is a pity that some general controlling power 
cannot be established of sufficient vigor to decide disputes, to regulate commerce, 
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to prevent wars, and to constitute a union which shall have weight and credit.”73 
In that same letter, he compared the Federal Convention to the General 
Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church taking place concurrently in 
Baltimore. It was Dr. Price’s hope that just as the church was endeavoring to 
improve central oversight over its many distinct congregations, the founders 
would also create a foundation from which to supervise the administration of the 
diverse states.  
 Roger Sherman, son of a Congregationalist minister and the only man to 
sign the Continental Association, the Declaration of Independence, the Articles of 
Confederation, and the U.S. Constitution, was experienced in navigating the 
intersection of religion and politics. Sherman was raised and educated in 
Stoughton, Massachusetts, amongst Congregationalist clergymen, and two of his 
brothers went on to become ministers as well. Sherman often invoked religious 
themes in his political and legal writings. In a pamphlet addressing problems 
related to bills of credit in New England, he referenced the “Law of God” as one 
of the sources of the right to private property.74 When he served in the lower 
house of the General Assembly in New Haven, Connecticut, he frequently 
weighed in on legislation concerning the maintenance of the town’s 
Congregationalist churches as well as on such other Puritan values as the 
punishment of vice.75 Sherman was guided by his understanding of religious 
contexts and framework in his approach to politics and the law. As a delegate to 
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the 1787 Constitutional Convention, he demonstrated that he was open to a form 
of divided government when he advocated expanding the national government, 
but sharply limiting its jurisdiction to certain enumerated powers.  
 Accustomed to the relationship between local congregations and having 
approached the idea of an ecclesiastical government in Connecticut at times, 
Sherman preferred that the reach of the national government be confined almost 
exclusively to matters of foreign policy. He argued that domestic matters could be 
best be handled by a confederation of the states.76 Rather than a confederation of 
states overseen by the national government, Sherman advocated a national 
government controlled by the states.77 Ultimately, in fear of losing control entirely 
to more populous states, Sherman, along with Oliver Ellsworth, was one of the 
principal advocates of what became known as the Connecticut Compromise.78 As 
such, Sherman was an influential figure in the design of Convention’s design of 
federalism, and the influence of Congregationalist governing structure is evident 
in his firm stance in favor of states’ rights.  
 Political Congregationalists understood that religious liberty and the 
autonomy of local governments (as well as churches) could best be protected by a 
centralized national government. Oliver Ellsworth, delegate to the Constitutional 
Convention and active member of the Congregationalist church, wrote a series of 
letters from “A Landholder” to promote the ratification of the Constitution. In the 
third such letter he stated, “A government capable of controlling the whole, and 
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bringing its force to a point, is one of the prerequisites for national liberty.”79 This 
point was echoed over and over in his “Letters from a Landholder,” of which 
there were ultimately thirteen. In them, Ellsworth expresses other common 
political principles that find their origin in Puritan values.	  
The Articles of Confederation and the Constitution were written in plain 
language in order to be understood by all literate Americans. Ellsworth wrote in 
Landholder IV of the practical benefits of concise and straightforward language.  
Had it swelled into the magnitude of a volume, there would have been 
more room to entrap the unwary, and the people who are to be its judges 
would have had neither patience nor opportunity to understand it. Had it 
been expressed in the scientific language of law, or those terms of art 
which we often find in political compositions, to the honorable gentleman 
it might have appeared more definite and less ambiguous; but to the great 
body of the people altogether obscure, and to accept it they must leap into 
the dark.80 
 
These sentiments are consistent with the Puritan ideals of personal responsibility 
and voluntary commitment to faith. With the advent of the Great Awakening in 
the first half of the eighteenth century religious accountability shifted from the 
collective to the individual, which required that members of a congregation have 
access to the word of God without the facilitation of the clergy.81 Puritans 
supported basic education within the colonies for this reason, among others. In 
Congregationalist communities, one expected the Bible to be accessible to all, and 
the framers used this same approach in drafting the Constitution. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Oliver Ellsworth, Landholder III, “Letters from a Landholder.” Accessed May 
4, 2014, http://www.infoplease.com/t/hist/federalist/landholder.html. 
80 Ibid., Landholder IV. 
81 Bonomi, 158. 
	   35	  
The 1787 Convention: Federalism and the Scope of Executive Power 
 The 1787 Federal Convention became the first stage of a wide-ranging 
American debate between the designers of the Constitution, and their advocacy 
for a strong executive and a centralized government, and the Constitution’s 
opponents, who feared that such changes would jeopardize the autonomy of the 
sovereign states. The Convention began on May 25, 1787, with discussion over 
the method of representation each state should be awarded. Immediately 
afterward, on June 1, the debate over the scope of the executive began. 
 Initial concerns over the powers of the executive, which extended to 
diplomacy and management of the national government, were that the position 
represented the “fetus of monarchy,” as Virginia delegate Edmund Randolph put 
it. His concern over copying the British form of government from which the states 
had so recently liberated themselves would be antithetical to the progress that the 
Convention had been called to advance. 82 Other delegates argued that the 
executive was a necessary position, but there was no immediate consensus over 
whether it ought to be vested in an individual, or a committee.83 During the next 
day of debates, Benjamin Franklin proposed that the abuse of power could be 
avoided by withholding any payment from those men entrusted with executive 
power.84 Franklin used religious examples to bolster his argument. He maintained 
that the Quaker model of church governance, which addressed all questions and 
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disputes in regular meetings, was ideal.85 This idea failed to gain traction among 
the other delegates. 
 After settling that the executive ought to be an individual rather than a 
group of men, debate began over the proper method of election. Pennsylvania 
delegate Gouverneur Morris argued that an executive appointed by the national 
legislature, and eligible for re-election, would never be capable of achieving 
independence. Only through democratic election by the people, he argued, could 
he truly represent the best interests of the nation.86 Morris further elaborated that 
an impeachable executive beholden to the national legislature would fail to 
provide an adequate check upon that branch of the government, and would 
become an extension of it.87 This was in keeping with the Congregationalists’ use 
of consensualism to legitimize the authority of the clergy.88  
 On June 21 the debate moved on to federalism and the proper distribution 
of state powers relative to national. James Madison argued that there was less to 
fear from encroachment by a national government than by the states, as the 
national government would be entrusted with the power to limit states’ 
interference with one another.89 This echoed Cotton’s view of all congregations as 
equals in their relation to one another but deferent to divine law. Unlike the 
United States government, Cotton had to devise a plan whereby congregations 
could combine to intervene in cases of extreme deviation from Congregationalist 
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principles. Madison asserted that the federalist American government would not 
need to fear such encroachment by state governments because there would be 
mechanisms in place for the national government to ensure equanimity between 
the states.90  
Essays written and published by John Jay, James Madison, and Alexander 
Hamilton, and later collected under the title The Federalist, exhorted the people of 
New York to vote for ratification of the new Constitution, and other supporters of 
the Constitution wrote prolifically as well to the same purpose.  In response, 
politicians, pamphleteers, and polemicists on the other side of the debate penned 
essays, letters, and pamphlets as well. A dominant concern of this debate was 
whether the proposed Constitution showed the potential for the emergence of a 
monarch. 
Although many believed that allocating executive power amongst a 
committee of men would alleviate any danger of a potential tyrant, other 
vigorously argued that a plural executive would pose a greater danger than an 
individual. The familiar Congregationalist model provided no such committee, 
barring the merger of father, son and Holy Spirit that comprised the Trinity. As 
any contemporary and canonical interpretation of those three divine entities 
considered them aspects of the same being, there is no doubt that 
Congregationalists deferred to a single, divine, executive. 
Alexander Hamilton made the case for a singular executive in Federalist 
70. Hamilton argued that were the executive power divided among a group of 
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men, then differences of opinion would be inevitable, and the splitting of 
Americans into factions would result.91 Moreover, such a split might “impede or 
frustrate the most important measures of the government, in the most critical 
emergencies of the state.”92 Opponents voiced their concern that such power, 
when entrusted to a single individual, would inevitably lead to abuse and tyranny. 
They earned the name “Anti-Federalist,” although not because they opposed a 
federalist system. 
Despite charges made by some of the Constitution’s supporters, its 
opponents were not, in fact, opposed to joining a federation of states. As a writer 
using the pen name John DeWitt wrote in his first essay to the people of 
Massachusetts in October 1787, “Upon the whole… I am as much a federal man 
as any person. In a federal union lies our political salvation.”93 But John DeWitt 
stressed the adjective “federal” as modifying the noun “union,” distinguishing 
what he favored from what he rejected as the centralizing, nationalizing vision of 
the Union that he saw embodied in the proposed Constitution.  The notion of 
belonging to a larger unified group was neither unfamiliar nor unsettling to the 
majority of Americans, particularly to those who belonged to religions that had 
spread to multiple regions. Congregationalists had first-hand experience 
belonging to an autonomous congregation within a larger whole. It was one 
reason why they saw the benefit of joining such a Union. However, De Witt’s 
sentiments against a centralizing or nationalizing Union resonated with those of 
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many Americans who had concerns about the loss of authority that would be 
involved in joining such a Union. 
 
Conclusion 
 Although American federalism did not delegate authority entirely to the 
sovereign states, nor submit to a divine code of law, many parallels can still be 
seen between the system embraced by the framers of the Constitution and colonial 
models of church governance used by the descendant of the Puritan separatists, 
and especially the Congregationalists. Despite their commitment to locally 
autonomous congregations, the Congregationalists understood the benefits and 
even the necessity of joining a larger, politically connected group in order to 
protect their own liberty. In the absence of a divine authority, a centralized, 
secular governing body provides a constitution and a federal judiciary to provide 
guidance where the congregation alone cannot. Congregationalism provided a 
model of divided power that the framers of the Constitution could use to develop 
a stronger, more stable system of government for the United States.  
 What these resonances effectively demonstrate is twofold. First, 
Congregationalists understood that a centralized authority, whether divinely 
inspired or secular, was crucial to maintaining both stability and liberty. Second, 
there are many ways that religion can influence politics, and they need not always 
be based in religious doctrine and ideology. In the case of federalism, the 
structures of church governance themselves were able to provide the essential 
framework for the new political system that emerged in the United States. 
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 That the Congregationalists accepted the need for centralized governance 
is evident in their speeches and writings and by their participation in national 
political development. A large number of American Federalists were members of 
the Congregationalist church, thereby demonstrating their commitment to the 
concept of a divided government with the ability to safeguard their freedom to 
worship, and to allow them the freedom to govern themselves in internal matters, 
without outside interference.94 Congregationalists’ governing structures were 
compatible with the pillars of American federalism. Understanding that a 
separation of church and state was essential to the preservation of religious 
liberty, members and leaders of the Congregationalist church accepted that in the 
case of the new American government, a centralized secular authority would need 
to take the place of the religious code of laws that governed each individual 
congregation within the larger organization of Congregationalist churches. 
 It is also clear that religion can influence political development in 
unexpected ways. The moral influence of religion on legal and political structures 
is a common subject of discussion and analysis, but little attention is paid to the 
framework of church governance that influenced creation of the American 
government in the wake of the Revolution. Examining the sources of these 
models and the way they shaped ideas about governance and politics among 
Congregationalist leadership in the eighteenth century illuminates an important 
element of the foundation on which the American government was built. It is 
crucial to note, however, that although this foundation rested in part on religious 
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sources, the framers of the Constitution were not attempting to establish a 
Christian nation. Their reliance on Congregationalist models did not extend 
beyond the structural to the ideological. 
 The emphasis placed on the local autonomy of Congregational churches 
provided the framers with a familiar model of reference in designing the federalist 
American government. Following the struggle for independence from the British 
crown, they were all too aware of the need for limited government and the 
preservation of state sovereignty, but the Puritans’ habitual dependence on a 
central (divine) code of governance and the failures of the Articles of 
Confederation together fueled the desire for some kind of centralized and 
coordinated authority to govern the union as a whole. Accustomed to a common 
religious authority, deferral to a national government was not a large ideological 
leap. 
 As widespread as Congregationalism became in colonial America, its 
framework could not help but provide a point of reference for the men who 
established the American government. The origins of federalism, along with the 
seeds of the federal judiciary and the limitations on executive power, can be found 
in the governmental framework developed by early church leaders such as John 
Cotton. As a result, the framers of the Constitution were careful to apply what 
they had learned from the familiar models of church hierarchy to the new 
Constitution. In this way, we can see that even with the core of its theological 
doctrine removed, the Congregational church was influential in the early political 
development of the United States.  
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